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absolute and unconditional liberty and denial of any laws, conventions or obligations.[2] Ideologies which sought universal salvation and identification with Christ's teaching (Dissent, Slavophilism) had their counterparts in the ideologies which demanded universal destruction and identification with anti-Christ (Nihilism, Terrorism).[3]

Among the intelligentsia a lack of a sense for methodical work, and lack of initiative were combined with preoccupation concerning grandiose and utopian plans on a world scale. There was a noticeable lack of preparation for these programs and a tendency to consider that having made plans was equal to their fulfillment. Such traits were so striking among some intelligentsia that they were given a special name (*Oblomovshtina*).[4]

It is known that a number of outstanding Russian intellectuals have shown a remarkable lack of emotional balance in their behavior. These would often move from one ideological camp into that of their bitter opponents. In ideological controversies no tolerance was shown for the opposite point of view. There was a tendency to treat all in the opposite camp as enemies. "Who is not with us is against us," was the principle applied in theory and practice. Some outstanding Russian intellectuals themselves admitted such traits in their character. Dostoyevsky, for instance, analyzing his own feelings stated: "In all things I go to the uttermost extremes; my life long I have never been acquainted with moderation." Not unlike this self-analysis of Dostoyevsky was that of Bakunin. In his "Confession to the Czar" he said: "There was in my character a radical defect: love for the fantastic, for out-of-the-way, unheard of adventures, for undertakings which open up an infinite horizon and whose end no man can foresee."[5]

According to General Golovine among the army officers there was a "tendency to drunkenness, churlishness and tyranny toward their subordinates," but there were also "many heroes among these negative types," and often a "regular officer showed such readiness to sacrifice himself that his superiors were forced to restrain his excessive ardor."[6] Lack of balance and stability was also reflected in the differences between military units. Often "next to a first class regiment there was another completely worthless."[7]

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of international Communism. "In our times," said Stalin before the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, "it is not the custom to give any consideration to the weak. . . . consideration is only given to the strong." The Party therefore undertook to drill millions of subjects in the use of arms and to develop an imposing army of professional soldiers.

The need of militarization of the entire population has been reflected in the Bolshevik ideology of total war. As early as the nineteen twenties the Bolshevik military strategist and Commissar of Defense, Mikhail Frunze, developed the theory of mobilization of the entire population and of regimentation of all aspects of life as a means of war preparation.[62] As a result of such a trend of thought pre-military training has been introduced into public schools and many teaching subjects have been oriented toward military thinking. Also the Party has sponsored and supported private organizations to promote physical fitness and military training (*Ossoaviokhim*) on a mass scale.

The need of the ruling faction to use military training as a school of obedience, loyalty, leadership, and war preparedness dictated also the policies concerning the system of military training. Consequently earlier ideas of fraternization and equality of ranks developed as a response to the longing for an anarchic brotherhood were attacked as "false democracy"; instead strict military discipline has been introduced and embodied in minute military regulations.[63] As a result very heavy and hard punishments have been provided for slightest breaches in discipline.

The military regulations now demand unquestionable obedience of the subordinate to his superior, and immediate and literal execution of his command regardless of what that command may be: "The order of the commander is law for the subordinate. The order must be fulfilled without question, literally and immediately."[64] To insure such unconditional obedience the military regulations authorize Soviet officers to use harsh means to cope with lapses of discipline. These include not only ordinary punishments, but physical beatings and even killing "in an emergency, when there is no time to spare." Significantly enough, the term "officer" was discarded and has been substituted by that of "commander."

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The wording of the Soviet armed forces oath bears witness to the vigor of this discipline and the strength of social pressure brought to its support. In addition to the punishment that may be expected by the Soviet soldier who did not fulfill his duty as expected, or who did not promptly sacrifice his life for the country is, according to this oath, "hatred and contempt of the working people" (*nenavist i prezrenie trudyashchikhsya*).[65]

At the same time the moral authority of the commander has been enhanced by a great amount of educational work and political agitation. The commander's unconditional authority is also consolidated with the help of an elaborate system of ranks, medals, and uniforms, and by the introduction of caste-like relations between the officers and the rank-and-file, a situation which is supported by the general trend in the Soviet society toward differentiation, superordination and subordination, and sharp social stratification.

Accordingly, Soviet practices in military education and training favor different types of schools according to the rank and the class. In the school for commanders the admittance practices favor children of professional army officers. In this manner Soviet military schools tend to solidify the present military caste system and to develop professional classes of hereditary warriors. Following Czarist traditions there is much pomp, ritual and ceremonial in the armed forces. There is also a certain emphasis on mysticism manifested in kneeling, bowing of heads in silence and stress on holiness. All these are means of appealing to emotions, of emphasizing the sacredness of military duty, and of developing loyalty and dedication to the colors.

As a means of political control the armed forces of the Soviet Union are completely centralized and thoroughly infiltrated by Party men. The strength of Party control of the Soviet armed forces is best seen in the degree of Party infiltration of its commanding personnel. By 1934 the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated persons in the commanding positions of the Soviet Army was about 72. The percentages were even greater in the branches which are considered especially crucial from the point of view of security, such as the tank divisions and the air force. In these two branches the percentage of Party and Party-affiliated

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701 665 members was close to 85 percent. And as to the top level of the army command by 1941 this top military hierarchy was one hundred percent Communist.[66]

To maintain ideological purity among the armed forces and to strengthen the Party's control is the specific function of the political officer and of the Partorg (Party organizer). The political officers have now regular army training and in the actual fighting, the political officer becomes "the commander's substitute or takes his place when the commander is disabled."[67] It is this ability of the Party to replace any army commander by an army trained but Party devoted man, that is expected to insure absolute control of the armed forces by the Party even in times of greatest stress and defeat. The duty of the political officers is [703] not only to interpret and to propagandize the latest utterances of the Party leaders or the decisions of the Politburo, but to watch for any weakening of enthusiasm, for any pessimism or gloomy views that may be noticed and to combat vigorously any signs of demoralization. The most important task of the political officers, however, is to cultivate martial spirit and to build up morale, thus creating "a psychological condition which sets up resistance to fear of discomfort, pain, or death."[68]

701 157 208 The goal of the Party is to infiltrate with martial spirit not the armed forces alone, but the whole Soviet population as a means of bolstering the morale of the Soviet masses behind the Bolshevik regime. This is being achieved by means of militarization of all public activities. The Bolshevik leaders consider that militarization is the only morale builder in a situation in which the laboring masses tend to become lethargic, apathetic and disinterested in their work. Speaking of the experiences in World War II, Stalin said that in that struggle people got transformed and acquired new qualities which strengthened the power of the [461] Bolsheviks: "But the people themselves in the rear have been transformed, they have been more efficient, less slipshod, more disciplined; they have learned to work in wartime fashion, and to realize their duty to our motherland."[69] Stalin looks at sports and athletics from the same point of view:

> We stood for five hours on the tomb while the show went on. The Generalissimo showed no sign of fatigue. On the contrary, he ap-